docs: show dynamic cloudflare trusted_proxies as primary example

caddy-cf now bundles WeidiDeng/caddy-cloudflare-ip, so document
'trusted_proxies cloudflare { interval 12h; timeout 15s }' as the
primary (auto-refreshing) approach, with the static-list method noted
as the fallback for builds without the plugin. Also explains
client_ip_headers (Cf-Connecting-Ip preferred, X-Forwarded-For fallback).

.github/workflows/build-docker-images.yml

@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ on:
     branches: [ "main" ]
 
 env:
-  REGISTRY: ghcr.io
-  IMAGE_NAME: ${{ github.repository }}
+  REGISTRY: tea.ahmza.com
+  IMAGE_NAME: ${{ gitea.repository }}
 
 jobs:
   build:
@@ -22,12 +22,12 @@ jobs:
       - name: Checkout Repo
         uses: actions/checkout@v4
 
-      - name: Login to GitHub Container Registry
+      - name: Login to Gitea Container Registry
         uses: docker/login-action@v3
         with:
           registry: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}
-          username: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
-          password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          username: ${{ gitea.repository_owner }}
+          password: ${{ secrets.GITEATOKEN }}
 
       - name: Set up QEMU
         uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3
@@ -38,14 +38,20 @@ jobs:
       - name: Build and push
         uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
         with:
-          platforms: linux/arm64
+          context: .
+          platforms: linux/arm64, linux/amd64
           push: true
           build-args: |
             BUILDKIT_CONTEXT_KEEP_GIT_DIR=true
           tags: |
-            ghcr.io/${{ github.repository_owner }}/blog-ahmza-com:latest
-            ghcr.io/${{ github.repository_owner }}/blog-ahmza-com:${{ github.event.head_commit.id }}
-  deployment:
+            ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ gitea.repository_owner }}/blog-ahmza-com:latest
+            ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ gitea.repository_owner }}/blog-ahmza-com:${{ gitea.event.head_commit.id }}
+          # Registry-backed build cache. The GitHub-hosted 'gha' cache is not
+          # reachable from self-hosted Gitea runners, so store the cache as a
+          # dedicated tag in the same registry instead.
+          cache-from: type=registry,ref=${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ gitea.repository_owner }}/blog-ahmza-com:buildcache
+          cache-to: type=registry,ref=${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ gitea.repository_owner }}/blog-ahmza-com:buildcache,mode=max
+  deploy:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     needs: build
 
@@ -54,14 +60,27 @@ jobs:
         uses: Alemiz112/netbird-connect@v1
         with:
           setup-key: ${{ secrets.NETBIRD_SETUP_KEY }}
-          hostname: 'blog-gh-actions'
+          hostname: 'gitea-actions-blog'
           management-url: ${{ secrets.NETBIRD_URL }}
 
-      - name: Deploy to Cluster
-        uses: appleboy/ssh-action@v1.2.2
+      - name: Deploy to RPIC-Cluster
+        # RPIC cluster is temporarily out of service. Don't let its failure
+        # block the Gimli deploy or fail the whole job. Remove this line once
+        # the cluster is back.
+        continue-on-error: true
+        uses: appleboy/ssh-action@v1
         with:
-          host: ${{ secrets.SSH_HOST }}
+          host: ${{ secrets.RPIC_HOST }}
           username: ${{ secrets.SSH_USER }}
-          key: ${{ secrets.SSH_KEY }}
+          key: ${{ secrets.RPIC_KEY }}
           port: ${{ secrets.SSH_PORT }}
           script: 'kubectl rollout restart deployment blog -n blog-ahmza-com'
+
+      - name: Deploy to Gimli
+        uses: appleboy/ssh-action@v1
+        with:
+          host: ${{ secrets.GIMLI_HOST }}
+          username: ${{ secrets.SSH_USER }}
+          key: ${{ secrets.GIMLI_KEY }}
+          port: ${{ secrets.SSH_PORT }}
+          script: 'docker compose down && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d'

Caddyfile

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+# Caddyfile for the blog behind Cloudflare.
+#
+# Topology: Cloudflare (terminates TLS)  ->  Caddy (HTTP :80)  ->  SWS (blog:80)
+#
+# Cloudflare handles the public HTTPS cert, so Caddy serves plain HTTP on :80
+# and does NOT need the Cloudflare DNS-01 / automatic-HTTPS setup. Set the
+# Cloudflare SSL/TLS mode to "Full" so CF->origin is encrypted at the network
+# layer (e.g. over your tunnel/Netbird), even though this listener is HTTP.
+#
+# Copy this file to /etc/caddy/Caddyfile on the caddy_cf host and reload:
+#   docker exec caddy_cf caddy reload --config /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
+# or restart the container.
+{
+	# Trust only Cloudflare's edge IPs so real visitor IPs (Cf-Connecting-Ip /
+	# X-Forwarded-For) are honoured only when the request actually comes from
+	# Cloudflare. This prevents header spoofing from any other source.
+	#
+	# The `cloudflare` IP source (WeidiDeng/caddy-cloudflare-ip, baked into the
+	# caddy-cf image) auto-fetches the ranges from cloudflare.com/ips-v4 and
+	# /ips-v6 and refreshes them periodically, so there's no static list to
+	# keep in sync.
+	servers {
+		trusted_proxies cloudflare {
+			interval 12h
+			timeout 15s
+		}
+		# Read the real visitor IP from these headers (only honoured for
+		# requests from trusted_proxies above). Cf-Connecting-Ip is
+		# Cloudflare's single authoritative end-user IP; X-Forwarded-For is
+		# the fallback if a request ever arrives without the CF header.
+		client_ip_headers Cf-Connecting-Ip X-Forwarded-For
+	}
+}
+
+# Bind to the hostname on the HTTP port only. Because the address has an
+# explicit ":80" scheme/port, Caddy will NOT try to provision a TLS cert.
+http://blog.ahmza.com {
+	# THE responder: proxy every request to the blog (SWS) container.
+	# This is what was missing before (requests fell through to a NOP -> blank page).
+	reverse_proxy blog:80
+
+	# Compression happens here (SWS has it disabled on purpose).
+	encode zstd gzip
+
+	# Security headers (single source of truth; SWS has security-headers off).
+	header {
+		Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload"
+		X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
+		X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
+		Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
+		# Drop Caddy's default Server header.
+		-Server
+	}
+
+	log {
+		output stdout
+		format console
+	}
+}

Dockerfile

@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
-FROM ghcr.io/hugomods/hugo:0.128.2 AS build
+FROM ghcr.io/hugomods/hugo:0.157.0 AS build
 WORKDIR /tmp/hugo
 COPY . .
 RUN hugo --gc --minify
 
-FROM nginx:alpine-slim
-WORKDIR  /usr/share/nginx/html
-COPY nginx.conf /etc/nginx/nginx.conf
-COPY --from=build /tmp/hugo/public .
+FROM ghcr.io/static-web-server/static-web-server:2
+COPY sws.toml /etc/sws.toml
+COPY --from=build /tmp/hugo/public /public
+ENV SERVER_CONFIG_FILE=/etc/sws.toml
 EXPOSE 80/tcp
+CMD ["--config-file", "/etc/sws.toml"]

README.md

@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@
 This repository contains the source code for my personal blog hosted at [blog.ahmza.com](https://blog.ahmza.com).
 
 ## Features
-Using GitLab provides several advantages:
-- **Highly Customizable CI/CD Pipelines**: Automated processes for building and deploying the blog.
-- **GitLab Container Image Repository**: Efficient management and storage of container images.
-- **Custom GitLab Runners**: Flexibility in managing the CI/CD environment.
+Using Gitea provides several advantages:
+- **Highly Customizable CI/CD Pipelines**: Automated processes for building and deploying the blog via Gitea Actions.
+- **Gitea Container Image Repository**: Efficient management and storage of container images.
+- **Custom Gitea Runners**: Flexibility in managing the CI/CD environment.
 
 The CI/CD pipeline is configured to build the blog for both amd64 and arm64
 architectures, allowing me to host the site on my [Pi cluster](https://blog.ahmza.com/posts/pi-docker-swarm/)
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ sacrificing performance.
 
 ## Implementation
 - **Hugo**: Converts Markdown files into static HTML/CSS/JS files.
-- **GitLab CI/CD**: Automates the build process and creates Docker images.
+- **Gitea Actions**: Automates the build process and creates Docker images.
 - **Kubernetes Cluster**: Serves the static files to users.
 
 ## To-Do List
@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ sacrificing performance.
 ## Notes
 
 ### Cloning the Repository
-To clone this repository along with its submodules, use the following command:
+The Blowfish theme is managed as a Hugo module, so no submodules are required.
+Clone the repository with:
 ```bash
-git clone git@gitlab.com:ahmza/blog.git
+git clone ssh://gitea@tea.ahmza.com:2222/ahmza/blog-ahmza-com.git
 ```

compose.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+services:
+  blog:
+    image: tea.ahmza.com/ahmza/blog-ahmza-com:latest
+    ports:
+      - 80:80
+    restart: unless-stopped

content/posts/hardening-linux/hardening-linux.md

@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Hardening Linux - An Update to Securing SSH
-description: "A Guide to Making Linux a Little more secure"
-tags: ["Linux", "Ubuntu"]
-author: "ahmza"
-date: 2025-06-05T15:34:10+01:00
-draft: true
-weight:
-featureimage:
-lastmod:
----
-
----
-{{< alert icon="fire" >}}
-> - This Guide assumes a Linux -> Linux SSH Session
-> - Please take care with production systems
-> - I take no responsibility for misconfigured systems and lockouts
-> - Try in a VM first and thank me later :)
-> - My Commands will be for Ubuntu Server 24.04
-{{< /alert >}}
----
-
-## Introduction
-This guide will go over the basic steps of hardening a Linux machine with a
-focus on remote access. The reason this is important is because when we begin to
-expose services to the internet and make them publicly accessible then that means
-anyone can probe around.
-
-There are better ways around this especially if you are the only user, or If
-your users dont mind taking an extra step before being able to access your
-resources. If you have not heard of _Overlay Networks_ before they're similar to
-VPNs however do not need any open ports as they use NAT Punching AKA Hole
-Punching.
-
-Check out my post on [Tailscale](/posts/no-more-port-forwarding/)
-
-regardless, it's always a good idea to implement good security practice so
-follow along and get your remote systems secure !!
-
-## Initial Steps
-
-Before we get into the meat and potatos of this guide, it would be a good idea
-to go over the following steps, especially if you are configuring a new install.
-
-### Software Updates
-Software updates are key for security as they will often include security
-patches. Depending on your flavour of Linux this command will vary.
-
-```bash
-sudo apt update && sudo apt upgrade
-```
-{{< alert "bell" >}}
-If you do not expect to be logging into this remote machine very often it may be
-a good idea to [setup automatic updates](/posts/setting-up-automatic-updates)
-however if you want more control then using [Ansible to update Remote Machines](/posts/ansible-to-manage-remote-servers)
-would be a better option.
-{{< /alert >}}
-
-### User Accounts
-It's not a good idea to continue to use a root account after install, it's much
-more secure to setup another user account with sudo access. The reason is the
-root account has complete control over the system, where a user account is more
-restricted by default. As well as this logging is more granular with different
-user accounts.
-
-The following command will allow you to create a new user, it will also ask you
-some questions about user information however the only required fields are the
-username and password if you want one.
-
-```bash
-adduser username
-```
-
-now we can add our newly created user to the sudo group to give admin permissions
-
-``` bash
-usermod -aG sudo username
-```
-
-{{< alert "bell" >}}
-Remember to replace username with your desired username
-{{< /alert >}}
-
-you can now logout of root and log back in as your user. Further action on the
-server should now be executed from this user account.
-
-## Creating SSH Keys
-Now that you have your own user account, we can create an SSH key for it. An SSH
-Key is a Public and Private key pair which allow client and server to
-authenticate using Public Key cryptography. Public Key cryptography is much
-harder to crack compared to a password, as well as this we no longer need to
-send passwords across networks which can be at risk of interception.
-
-SSH can also be more convenient once you set up ssh-agent which will be covered
-later in the guide, with password authentication you need to enter a password
-everytime, however with ssh-agent you can enter your ssh-key password once and
-it remains unlocked for the remainder of the session.
-
-{{< alert "fire" >}}
-**IMPORTANT:** **NEVER** share your private ssh key ... it's private for a reason.
-{{< /alert >}}
-
-By running the following command you will create an ssh-key !!
-```bash
-ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C NameYourKey
-```
-- `-t` - specifies the type of cryptographic algorithm we will use
-- `-C` - notice it's capital, A name for your ssh keys. I usually give them the
-hostname of the local machine
-
-
-
-## Conclusion

content/posts/hardening-linux/index.md

@@ -0,0 +1,551 @@
+---
+title: Hardening Linux - An Update to Securing SSH
+description: "A Guide to Making Linux a Little more secure"
+tags: ["Linux", "Ubuntu"]
+author: "ahmza"
+date: 2025-06-05T15:34:10+01:00
+draft: true
+weight:
+featureimage:
+lastmod:
+---
+
+Update to [Securing SSH](/posts/securing-ssh/)
+
+{{< alert icon="fire" >}}
+
+> - This Guide assumes a Linux -> Linux SSH Session
+> - Please take care with production systems
+> - I take no responsibility for misconfigured systems and lockouts
+> - Try in a VM first and thank me later :)
+> - My Commands will be for Debian 13 Trixie
+
+{{< /alert >}}
+
+## Introduction
+
+This guide will go over the basic steps of hardening a Linux machine with a
+focus on remote access. The reason this is important is because when we begin to
+expose services to the internet and make them publicly accessible then that means
+anyone can probe around.
+
+If you have not heard of _Overlay Networks_ before they're similar to
+VPNs however do not need any open ports as they use NAT Punching.
+
+Check out my post on [Netbird](/posts/no-more-port-forwarding/#netbird) an alternative to [Tailscale](/posts/no-more-port-forwarding/#tailscale)
+
+Follow along and get your remote systems secure !!
+
+## Initial Steps
+
+Before we get into the meat and potatoes of this guide, it would be a good idea
+to go over the following steps, especially if you are configuring a new install.
+
+### Software Updates
+
+Software updates are key for security as they will often include security
+patches. Depending on your flavour of Linux this command will vary.
+
+```bash
+sudo apt update && sudo apt upgrade
+```
+
+{{< alert "bell" >}}
+If you do not expect to be logging into this remote machine very often
+then using [Ansible to update Remote Machines](/posts/ansible-to-manage-remote-servers)
+is a great alternative to the manual approach
+{{< /alert >}}
+
+### User Accounts
+
+It's not a good idea to continue using the root account after install, reason being
+the root account has complete control over the system, whereas a user account is more
+restricted by default. Logging is more granular with different user accounts,
+especially with more than one user.
+
+The following command will allow you to create a new user, it will also ask you
+some questions about user information however the only required fields are the
+username and password.
+
+```bash
+adduser username
+```
+
+now we can add our newly created user to the sudo group to give admin permissions
+
+```bash
+usermod -aG sudo username
+```
+
+{{< alert "bell" >}}
+Remember to replace username with your desired username
+{{< /alert >}}
+
+you can now logout of root and log back in as your user. Further action on the
+server should now be executed from this user account.
+
+## Creating SSH Keys
+
+Now that you have your own user account, we can create an SSH key for it. An SSH
+Key is a Public and Private key pair which allow client and server to
+authenticate using Public Key cryptography. Public Key cryptography is much
+harder to crack compared to a password, also we no longer send passwords across
+networks which can be at risk of interception.
+
+SSH can also be more convenient once you set up ssh-agent which will be covered
+later in the guide, with password authentication you need to enter a password
+everytime, however with ssh-agent you can enter your ssh-key password once and
+it remains unlocked for the remainder of the session.
+
+{{< alert "fire" >}}
+**IMPORTANT:** **NEVER** share your private ssh key ... it's private for a reason.
+{{< /alert >}}
+
+By running the following command you will create an ssh-key !!
+
+```bash
+ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C NameYourKey
+```
+
+- `-t` - specifies the type of cryptographic algorithm we will use
+- `-C` - notice it's capital, A name for your ssh keys. I usually give them the
+  hostname of the local machine
+
+{{< alert "bell" >}}
+If you would like a deep dive into why I pick this algorithm, click the drop down, else skip ahead :D
+{{< /alert >}}
+{{< details >}}
+The `-t` flag specifies the type of encryption to use. The reasons I have gone with `ed25519`:
+
+- `ed25519` is faster and generation, signing and verification operations
+- Believed to be more resistant to certain attacks
+- shorter key length at equivalent security levels
+
+The following output is a speed test of different encryption algorithms
+
+```bash
+~ ❯ openssl speed rsa1024 rsa2048 rsa4096 ecdsap256 ed25519
+Doing 1024 bits private rsa's for 10s: 73191 1024 bits private RSA's in 9.99s
+Doing 1024 bits public rsa's for 10s: 1161066 1024 bits public RSA's in 9.99s
+Doing 2048 bits private rsa's for 10s: 11346 2048 bits private RSA's in 9.99s
+Doing 2048 bits public rsa's for 10s: 389696 2048 bits public RSA's in 9.99s
+Doing 4096 bits private rsa's for 10s: 1643 4096 bits private RSA's in 10.00s
+Doing 4096 bits public rsa's for 10s: 112285 4096 bits public RSA's in 9.99s
+Doing 256 bits sign ecdsa's for 10s: 294504 256 bits ECDSA signs in 9.85s
+Doing 256 bits verify ecdsa's for 10s: 101912 256 bits ECDSA verify in 9.99s
+Doing 253 bits sign Ed25519's for 10s: 147102 253 bits Ed25519 signs in 9.99s
+Doing 253 bits verify Ed25519's for 10s: 53317 253 bits Ed25519 verify in 10.00s
+version: 3.0.13
+...
+
+...
+                  sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+rsa 1024 bits 0.000136s 0.000009s   7326.4 116222.8
+rsa 2048 bits 0.000880s 0.000026s   1135.7  39008.6
+rsa 4096 bits 0.006086s 0.000089s    164.3  11239.7
+                              sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+ 256 bits ecdsa (nistp256)   0.0000s   0.0001s  29898.9  10201.4
+                              sign    verify    sign/s verify/s
+ 253 bits EdDSA (Ed25519)   0.0001s   0.0002s  14724.9   5331.7
+```
+
+in my testing it seems as though ecdsa is actually a touch faster than ed25519 but my
+testing is in no way scientific or thorough enough Ill leave that to the Pros.
+
+`RSA 4096` is considered to be quite secure however the speed difference compared to
+the more modern algorithms is considerably longer. Each algorithm has its strengths
+and weaknesses, so research which works best for you.
+
+In a homelab environment how noticeable this would actually be im not sure. We are
+talking tiny fracions of a second.
+
+for more insight: [https://serverfault.com/questions/1081266/ssh-keys-ed25519-vs-rsa-performance-demystified](https://serverfault.com/questions/1081266/ssh-keys-ed25519-vs-rsa-performance-demystified)
+{{< /details >}}
+
+When creating the SSH key you will be presented with a two questions.
+
+- Location of the key
+- Password
+
+The default location of the key `$HOME/.ssh/id_ed25519` is fine for me.
+
+I would strongly advise setting a good password for you SSH keys.
+
+Now we can start copying these keys to remote hosts. The following command
+will copy the public key to the remote host.
+
+```
+ssh-copy-id user@remote-host
+```
+
+{{< alert "bell" >}}
+Change `user` and `remote-host` to your own values
+{{< /alert >}}
+
+If that succeeded then we should be anble to connect to the remote host using our ssh key
+
+Hoping that you set a password for your ssh key, when attempting to connect the password prompt
+will look slightly different. Instead of asking for the remote users password its asking for your
+SSH keys password.
+
+And just like that your system is a lot more secure.
+
+## SSH key distribution
+
+One pain point with SSH keys is when you have multiple ssh keys and multiple remote servers.
+Having to distribute these keys can be time consuming, and honestly a waste of time.
+
+One method thats easy to get up and running with minimal effort is using Github. We can add our
+public SSH keys to github and run a command on our servers to pull those public keys.
+
+{{< alert "bell" >}}
+There are more advanced ways to get around this such as [SSH Certificate Authorities](posts/ssh-certificate-authority)
+but thats out of the scope for this post.
+{{< /alert >}}
+
+To add an SSH key to github go to [github.com](https://github.com) and navigate to the SSH and GPG keys page
+
+`Profile Icon > Settings > SSH and GPG keys > New SSH key`
+
+[quicklink](https://github.com/settings/ssh/new)
+
+- Title: Give a descriptive name for the key
+- Key Type: Authentication key
+- Key: Paste in the public key
+
+to get your public key
+
+```
+cat $HOME/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+```
+
+Finally click `Add SSH Key`
+
+### Importing the keys
+
+When we are on the remote host we can run the following command to import our public ssh keys from github
+Make sure the username is YOUR username.
+
+```
+ssh-import-id-gh username
+```
+
+## SSH Agent
+
+Now we can setup the ssh agent to enable us to keep ssh-keys "logged-in" per session reducing the amount
+we need to enter our password each time we want to spawn a new ssh session.
+
+I make use of a bash script which is called in my `.zshrc` or `.bashrc`. So each time I spawn a new session
+(Usually computer restart) it will spawn the ssh-agent and I can unlock my key for later use.
+
+```bash
+##### START Fix for ssh-agent #####
+# Orig Ref: http://mah.everybody.org/docs/ssh
+# Ref: https://web.archive.org/web/20220513101246/http://mah.everybody.org/docs/ssh
+-
+SSH_ENV="$HOME/.ssh/environment"
+-
+function start_agent {
+    echo "Initialising new SSH agent..."
+    /usr/bin/ssh-agent | sed 's/^echo/#echo/' > "${SSH_ENV}"
+    echo succeeded
+    chmod 600 "${SSH_ENV}"
+    . "${SSH_ENV}" > /dev/null
+    /usr/bin/ssh-add;
+}
+-
+# Source SSH settings, if applicable
+if [ -f "${SSH_ENV}" ]; then
+    . "${SSH_ENV}" > /dev/null
+    #ps ${SSH_AGENT_PID} doesn't work under cywgin
+    ps -ef | grep ${SSH_AGENT_PID} | grep ssh-agent$ > /dev/null || {
+        start_agent;
+    }
+else
+    start_agent;
+fi
+##### END Fix for ssh-agent #####
+```
+
+The next time your .rc file is sourced you will be asked for your ssh key password.
+
+## Modify SSH Config
+
+{{< alert "bell" >}}
+Im using `vim`, if you are unfamilliar with vim you may find it easier to use `nano`
+instead. If you want to try vim just remember you start in command mode, to insert
+text you can press `i` to enter insert mode. When ready to save and quit press `esc`
+to go back to command mode and type `:wq` the colon allows you to write commands,
+`w` represents write and `q` represents quit.
+{{< /alert >}}
+
+```
+sudo vim /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+```
+
+Some options are already in the file, some just need uncommenting and some you will
+need to add yourself.
+
+```
+Protocol 2
+Port 2222
+PermitRootLogin no
+MaxAuthTries 5
+PasswordAuthentication no
+PermitEmptyPasswords no
+AllowUsers username username2
+ClientAliveInterval 180
+ClientAliveCountMax 1
+```
+
+- Protocol 2 - is the latest and most secure ssh protocol version
+- Port 2222 - change the default port from 22 to 2222
+  - Stops port scanners on the internet hunting for default open ports
+- PermitRootLogin no - Prevents the root user being able to login via ssh
+- MaxAuthTries 5 - The number of allowed authentication attempts per connection, i.e if an attacker is trying to brute force a server after 3 failed attempts - or half of the set value - these failed attempts will be logged (useful to know for fail2ban) and then after 4 get locked out.
+- PasswordAuthentication no - Disable password authentication since we use SSH keys now !!
+- PermitEmptyPasswords no - may be redundant since we set no password authentication …
+- AllowUsers - only allow certain users to use SSH
+- ClientAliveInterval 180 - SSH daemon will send a packet to the client every 180s
+- ClientAliveCountMax 1 - when the ClientAliveInterval packet is sent if the client does not respond the session is closed. If this value is 2 for example the SSH daemon will have a fault tolerance of 2 meaning that the client has to miss 2 packets each 180s apart before the session closes.
+
+With the current ClientAliveInterval and ClientAliveCountMax you have 3 minutes of "downtime" before the
+session is dropped. Downtime could be the internet connection dropped or you closed your laptop lid and
+the machine goes to sleep. Essentially any state where the client machine cannot respond to the remote
+servers "ping" every 3 minutes.
+
+If 3 minutes is too little time for you, you may increase the interval or increase the ClientAliveCountMax
+value.
+
+## Fail2Ban
+
+Fail2Ban is an IPS (Intrusion Protection System) which monitors ssh logs looking for failed login attempts
+If multiple failed login attempts are detected then the source IP address is blocked in the firewall.
+
+### Install Fail2Ban
+
+```
+sudo apt install fail2ban
+```
+
+### Fail2Ban Configuration
+
+```
+sudo vim /etc/fail2ban/jail.local
+```
+
+I use the following configuration
+
+```fail2ban
+[DEFAULT]
+  bantime = 8h
+  ignoreip = 127.0.0.1/8 xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/xx
+  ignoreself = true
+  [sshd]
+  enabled = true
+  port = 2222
+  filter = sshd
+  logpath = /var/log/auth.log
+  maxretry = 2
+```
+
+- bantime - how long to block network connections for
+- ignoreip - IP addresses / ranges that are ignored by fail2ban useful if you have static IPs set on your local machines or want to ignore your whole local network.
+- ignoreself - dont ban itself xD
+- sshd
+  - enabled - enables log monitoring for ssh
+  - port - the port we are using for ssh
+  - logpath - where your ssh logs are
+  - maxretry - how many retries before a connection is blocked
+
+{{< alert "bell" >}}
+maxretry in fail2ban is set to 2 because in our sshd_config file we set MaxAuthTries
+to 5. So SSH will start to log after 3 failed attempts. When we hit 5 failed
+attempt fail2Ban sees 2 failed attempts so it will block network connections.
+So at 5 failed attempts **TOTAL** fail2ban blocks connections
+{{< /alert >}}
+
+these settings can be a bit aggressive in some situations so feel free to make them
+a bit more relaxed however with our SSH keys setup properly we should not be
+getting failed login attempts so this is _in my opinion_ already quite relaxed.
+
+## Firewall
+
+One thing I would like to mention here before we continue is that our network
+security should not only be hardened on the edge. Each layer of our network
+should be secured. The reason for this practice is that if an attacker does
+manage to break through your edge then you can still isolate them and protect
+resources from within the network. So even though we may have an edge firewall
+we should consider setting up a firewall on each of our servers.
+
+On Ubuntu server `ufw` is installed by default, thats what Ill be going over here.
+You can install `ufw` on other distributions however they usually have default
+firewall implementations like `iptables`
+
+By Default the firewall on ubuntu servers is disabled. To check this:
+
+```
+sudo ufw status
+```
+
+{{< alert "bell" >}}
+While its inactive we dont need to worry about locking ourselves out however
+be aware that once your firewall is active any incoming traffic will be dropped
+if we do not create accept rules for them.
+{{< /alert >}}
+
+We are going to create 2 catch all rules.
+
+```
+sudo ufw default allow outgoing
+sudo ufw default deny incoming
+```
+
+- Allow all traffic going out of the server
+- Deny all traffic coming into the server
+
+Create a rule to allow our SSH traffic, make sure you set the port number you use to ssh
+
+```
+sudo ufw allow 2222
+```
+
+If you need any other incoming ports open, do that here.
+
+We can now enable the firewall.
+
+```
+sudo ufw enable
+```
+
+check the status
+
+```
+sudo ufw status
+```
+
+## SSH Config
+
+When we start using unconventional settings such as port 2222 it can be useful
+to setup an ssh config file on our client machines.
+
+My config files looks something like
+This makes any host on my local network use the username and 2222.
+I also have an alias for my VPS server.
+
+```
+Host 10.10.100.*
+    User username
+    Port 2222
+
+Host vps-deb13-2c8g
+    HostName ipaddress-specific-server
+    User username
+    Port 2222
+```
+
+## 2 Factor Authentication - Optional
+
+We can use 2 factor authentication on our servers much like you would with
+something like github. By enabling the TOTP pam module when we login to the
+server it will ask for a Time Based TOTP code.
+
+These keys are time based and so it's vital that the time on the server and
+client are correct.
+
+The module I found is developed by Google and is open source
+[google/google-authenticator-libpam](https://github.com/google/google-authenticator-libpam)
+
+Install the module
+
+```
+sudo apt install libpam-google-authenticator
+```
+
+Edit the config
+
+```
+sudo vim /etc/pam.d/sshd
+```
+
+Comment out the following line
+
+```
+# @include common-auth
+```
+
+If we do not uncomment this then even though we are using SSH keys we will be
+asked to use our user password to authenticate too.
+
+Add the following line to the bottom of the file
+
+```
+auth required pam_google_authenticator.so
+```
+
+{{< alert "bell" >}}
+If you have multiple users then it may be worth adding the nullok option as
+this will prevent users who have not setup TOTP from being locked out.
+
+```
+auth required pam_google_authenticator.so nullok
+```
+
+{{< /alert >}}
+
+Edit the ssh config
+
+```
+sudo vim /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+```
+
+Edit / Add the following
+
+```
+KbdInteractiveAuthentication yes
+AuthenticationMethods publickey,keyboard-interactive
+```
+
+We are now ready to generte the TOTP codes for the user, run the following
+
+```
+google-authenticator
+```
+
+- `Do you want authentication tokens to be time-based (y/n)` - y
+- Scan the Code into your Authenticator app or if you have a password manager use that :D
+- You will be asked to enter a TOTP from the authenticator app
+- You will be given recovery codes, save them somewhere
+- `Do you want me to update your "/home/user/.google-authenticator" file ? (y/n)` - y
+- The following questions are your choice however I answered
+- `Do you want Disallow multiple uses of the same authentication token … (y/n)` - y
+- `… In order to compensate for possible time-skew … (y/n)` - n (if you do experience problems you may change this option)
+- `… 3 Login attempts every 30s … (y/n)` - y
+
+![google-authenticator-cli](google-authenticator-cli.webp)
+
+## Restart
+
+Now is the moment of truth, restarting the sshd service and fail2ban
+
+```
+sudo service ssh restart
+sudo systemctl restart sshd.service
+sudo systemctl restart fail2ban
+```
+
+Once you are comfortable you have everything setup I would suggest a full system
+restart as updates were performed earlier too.
+
+## Conclusion
+
+This is a great start to improving security on your remote servers. But it's
+only the start. There are still many things you could change / implement to
+further increase security.
+
+There are also network considerations like VLANs and ensuring solid firewall
+rules.
+
+As mentioned earlier in the post you could implement overlay networks such as
+Netbird or Tailscale when working over the internet instead of exposing all
+the ports.

docs/caddy-reverse-proxy.md

@@ -0,0 +1,423 @@
+# Caddy as a Reverse Proxy
+
+This document describes how to run [Caddy](https://caddyserver.com/) as a
+reverse proxy in front of the blog.
+
+It uses the custom [`caddy-cf`](https://github.com/ahmzaa/caddy-cf) image
+(`ghcr.io/ahmzaa/caddy-cf:latest`) — a Caddy build with the **Cloudflare DNS
+module** baked in.
+
+## Deployment topologies
+
+There are two supported ways to run Caddy in front of the blog. **Pick one.**
+
+### 1. Cloudflare in front (current production) — HTTP only
+
+```
+Cloudflare (terminates TLS)  ->  Caddy (HTTP :80)  ->  SWS (blog:80)
+```
+
+Cloudflare proxies the domain and provides the public HTTPS certificate, so
+Caddy only needs to serve plain **HTTP on :80** and reverse-proxy to the blog.
+Caddy does **not** provision a TLS cert in this mode. This is the live setup and
+its config is the committed [`Caddyfile`](../Caddyfile) at the repo root —
+see [Cloudflare-fronted setup](#cloudflare-fronted-setup-http-only) below.
+
+Set the Cloudflare **SSL/TLS mode to "Full"** so the Cloudflare→origin hop is
+still encrypted at the network layer (e.g. over Netbird), even though Caddy's
+listener is HTTP.
+
+### 2. Caddy terminates TLS via Cloudflare DNS-01
+
+```
+Client  ->  Caddy (HTTPS :443, ACME DNS-01)  ->  SWS (blog:80)
+```
+
+Caddy obtains/renews the certificate itself using the ACME **DNS-01** challenge
+through the Cloudflare API — no inbound `80`/`443` from the public internet is
+required, which suits a Netbird-only setup with no Cloudflare proxy in front.
+The stock Caddy image cannot do this; the `caddy-cf` build bundles the
+Cloudflare DNS provider plugin. See the Docker Compose / Kubernetes examples
+later in this document.
+
+## Why a reverse proxy?
+
+The blog is served by [Static Web Server (SWS)](https://static-web-server.net/),
+a tiny Rust binary that ships static files over plain HTTP on port `80`. SWS is
+intentionally kept lean — it does **not** terminate TLS, and its compression and
+security headers are disabled (see `sws.toml`). Those concerns are delegated to
+the reverse proxy so that each layer owns exactly one job:
+
+| Concern              | Owned by | Notes                                             |
+| -------------------- | -------- | ------------------------------------------------- |
+| TLS / HTTPS certs    | Cloudflare *or* Caddy | Cloudflare in topology 1; Caddy (DNS-01) in topology 2 |
+| Compression (gzip/zstd) | Caddy | `encode` directive; SWS compression is off        |
+| Security headers     | Caddy    | Single source of truth, avoids duplicate headers  |
+| Serving static files | SWS      | Reads from `/public`, sets `Cache-Control`/`ETag` |
+| Cache-Control / ETag | SWS      | Declared at the origin, passed through by Caddy   |
+
+### Why the Cloudflare DNS-01 challenge?
+
+Caddy does **automatic HTTPS** out of the box, but the default HTTP-01 /
+TLS-ALPN-01 challenges require ports `80`/`443` to be publicly reachable so
+Let's Encrypt can verify domain ownership. This project's infrastructure is
+reached over [Netbird](https://netbird.io/) (a private overlay network), so
+those inbound challenges are not an option.
+
+The **DNS-01** challenge instead proves domain ownership by creating a TXT
+record via the Cloudflare API — no inbound connectivity required. The `caddy-cf`
+image bundles the Cloudflare DNS provider plugin so Caddy can do this. All it
+needs is a Cloudflare API token with **Zone:DNS:Edit** permission on the
+`ahmza.com` zone.
+
+## Origin contract
+
+Whatever the deployment, the SWS origin exposes:
+
+- **Protocol:** plain HTTP
+- **Port:** `80`
+- **Health endpoint:** `GET /health` → `200 OK`
+- **Cache headers:** already set by SWS (Caddy should pass them through, not override)
+
+Caddy only needs to handle TLS (or let Cloudflare do it), add compression +
+security headers, and forward requests to that origin.
+
+---
+
+## Cloudflare-fronted setup (HTTP only)
+
+**This is the current production topology.** The canonical config is the
+committed [`Caddyfile`](../Caddyfile) at the repo root; copy it to the
+`caddy_cf` host and reload. Highlights:
+
+- **`http://blog.ahmza.com`** — the explicit `http://` scheme binds Caddy to
+  `:80` only and stops it from trying to provision a TLS certificate (Cloudflare
+  already serves HTTPS to visitors).
+- **`reverse_proxy blog:80`** — proxies to the blog (SWS) container by its
+  compose service name. Caddy and the blog container must share a Docker
+  network. Omitting this responder makes Caddy return an empty `NOP` response —
+  i.e. a **blank page**.
+- **`encode zstd gzip`** — compression happens here (SWS has it disabled).
+- **`header { ... }`** — security headers (SWS has them disabled).
+- **`trusted_proxies cloudflare { ... }`** + **`client_ip_headers
+  Cf-Connecting-Ip X-Forwarded-For`** — so the real visitor IP is used for
+  logging/matchers, but only when the request genuinely comes from Cloudflare
+  (prevents header spoofing from any other source). The `cloudflare` IP source
+  ([WeidiDeng/caddy-cloudflare-ip](https://github.com/WeidiDeng/caddy-cloudflare-ip),
+  baked into the `caddy-cf` image) auto-fetches the ranges from
+  <https://www.cloudflare.com/ips-v4/> and <https://www.cloudflare.com/ips-v6/>
+  and refreshes them on the configured `interval`, so there is no static list to
+  maintain:
+
+  ```caddy
+  trusted_proxies cloudflare {
+  	interval 12h
+  	timeout 15s
+  }
+  ```
+
+  `client_ip_headers` lists which header holds the real visitor IP:
+  `Cf-Connecting-Ip` is Cloudflare's single authoritative end-user IP, with
+  `X-Forwarded-For` as the fallback. It is only trusted for requests coming from
+  the `trusted_proxies` above.
+
+  > If you ever run without the `caddy-cloudflare-ip` plugin, you can instead
+  > pin the static ranges with `trusted_proxies static <ip/cidr ...>` copied
+  > from the Cloudflare IP pages, but then you must keep them in sync manually.
+
+Deploy and reload:
+
+```bash
+# Put the Caddyfile in place on the caddy_cf host (e.g. into the ./conf mount),
+# then reload without downtime:
+docker exec caddy_cf caddy reload --config /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
+
+# Verify from the host (expect HTTP 200, Content-Encoding: gzip, X-Frame-Options):
+curl -sI -H "Accept-Encoding: gzip" http://localhost/ | grep -iE 'HTTP|content-encoding|x-frame'
+```
+
+> **Cloudflare SSL/TLS mode:** set it to **Full** so the Cloudflare→origin hop
+> is encrypted at the network layer (e.g. over Netbird), even though Caddy's
+> listener is plain HTTP.
+
+---
+
+The remaining sections describe **topology 2** (Caddy terminates TLS itself via
+the Cloudflare DNS-01 challenge) for setups without a Cloudflare proxy in front.
+
+## Docker Compose (Gimli)
+
+Run Caddy and the blog container on the same Docker network. Caddy reaches the
+blog by its service name (`blog`) over the internal network, so the blog's port
+does **not** need to be published to the host.
+
+The Cloudflare API token is passed to Caddy as the `CF_API_TOKEN` environment
+variable and referenced from the Caddyfile — keep it out of the committed
+config. Store it in a `.env` file (git-ignored) next to `compose.yml`:
+
+```dotenv
+# .env
+CF_API_TOKEN=your-cloudflare-api-token-with-zone-dns-edit
+```
+
+### `compose.yml`
+
+```yaml
+services:
+  blog:
+    image: ghcr.io/ahmzaa/blog-ahmza-com
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    # No host port mapping needed — only Caddy talks to it, over the
+    # internal Docker network. Remove the previous "80:80" publish.
+    expose:
+      - "80"
+
+  caddy:
+    image: ghcr.io/ahmzaa/caddy-cf:latest   # Caddy + Cloudflare DNS module
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    container_name: caddy-cf
+    ports:
+      - "80:80"
+      - "443:443"
+      - "443:443/udp"   # HTTP/3 (QUIC)
+    environment:
+      # Consumed by the {env.CF_API_TOKEN} placeholder in the Caddyfile.
+      - CF_API_TOKEN=${CF_API_TOKEN}
+    volumes:
+      - ./conf:/etc/caddy       # contains the Caddyfile
+      - ./data:/data            # persists certificates — DO NOT lose this
+      - ./config:/config
+```
+
+Place the Caddyfile at `./conf/Caddyfile`.
+
+### `./conf/Caddyfile`
+
+```caddy
+# Reusable Cloudflare DNS-01 TLS snippet. The token is read from the
+# CF_API_TOKEN environment variable so it never lives in the config file.
+(cloudflare) {
+	tls {
+		dns cloudflare {env.CF_API_TOKEN}
+	}
+}
+
+blog.ahmza.com {
+	# Obtain/renew the cert via the Cloudflare DNS-01 challenge.
+	import cloudflare
+
+	# Reverse proxy to the blog container by its compose service name.
+	reverse_proxy blog:80 {
+		# Use the SWS health endpoint for active upstream checks.
+		health_uri /health
+		health_interval 10s
+		health_timeout 2s
+	}
+
+	# Compression is done here, not in SWS.
+	encode zstd gzip
+
+	# Security headers live here so there is a single source of truth.
+	header {
+		Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload"
+		X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
+		X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
+		Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
+		# Remove Caddy's default Server header
+		-Server
+	}
+
+	log {
+		output stdout
+		format console
+	}
+}
+```
+
+> **Certificate persistence:** the `./data` volume stores the issued
+> certificates and ACME account key. Keep it — deleting it forces Caddy to
+> re-request certificates and can hit Let's Encrypt rate limits.
+
+Bring it up with:
+
+```bash
+docker compose up -d
+```
+
+---
+
+## Kubernetes (Raspberry Pi cluster)
+
+The blog runs as a `Deployment` behind a `Service`. Caddy runs as its own
+`Deployment` and proxies to that Service via in-cluster DNS
+(`blog.blog-ahmza-com.svc.cluster.local`, or just `blog` from within the same
+namespace).
+
+### Cloudflare API token Secret
+
+Store the Cloudflare API token in a `Secret` and inject it into the Caddy
+container as the `CF_API_TOKEN` environment variable (never bake it into the
+ConfigMap):
+
+```bash
+kubectl create secret generic caddy-cloudflare \
+  --namespace blog-ahmza-com \
+  --from-literal=CF_API_TOKEN='your-cloudflare-api-token-with-zone-dns-edit'
+```
+
+### Caddyfile via ConfigMap
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ConfigMap
+metadata:
+  name: caddy-config
+  namespace: blog-ahmza-com
+data:
+  Caddyfile: |
+    (cloudflare) {
+    	tls {
+    		dns cloudflare {env.CF_API_TOKEN}
+    	}
+    }
+
+    blog.ahmza.com {
+    	import cloudflare
+
+    	reverse_proxy blog:80 {
+    		health_uri /health
+    		health_interval 10s
+    		health_timeout 2s
+    	}
+
+    	encode zstd gzip
+
+    	header {
+    		Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload"
+    		X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
+    		X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
+    		Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
+    		-Server
+    	}
+
+    	log {
+    		output stdout
+    		format console
+    	}
+    }
+```
+
+### Caddy Deployment + Service
+
+```yaml
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: caddy
+  namespace: blog-ahmza-com
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: caddy
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app: caddy
+    spec:
+      containers:
+        - name: caddy
+          image: ghcr.io/ahmzaa/caddy-cf:latest   # Caddy + Cloudflare DNS module
+          ports:
+            - containerPort: 80
+            - containerPort: 443
+            - containerPort: 443
+              protocol: UDP
+          env:
+            - name: CF_API_TOKEN
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef:
+                  name: caddy-cloudflare
+                  key: CF_API_TOKEN
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: config
+              mountPath: /etc/caddy
+            - name: data
+              mountPath: /data      # certificate storage — must persist
+      volumes:
+        - name: config
+          configMap:
+            name: caddy-config
+        - name: data
+          persistentVolumeClaim:
+            claimName: caddy-data
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: caddy-data
+  namespace: blog-ahmza-com
+spec:
+  accessModes: ["ReadWriteOnce"]
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 256Mi
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: caddy
+  namespace: blog-ahmza-com
+spec:
+  type: LoadBalancer   # or NodePort, depending on the cluster
+  selector:
+    app: caddy
+  ports:
+    - name: http
+      port: 80
+      targetPort: 80
+    - name: https
+      port: 443
+      targetPort: 443
+```
+
+> **Blog Service:** the existing `blog` Service should expose port `80` and
+> target the SWS container port `80`. Caddy reaches it as `blog:80` from inside
+> the same namespace.
+
+> **Certificate persistence:** the `caddy-data` PVC is the K8s equivalent of the
+> `./data` Docker volume. Without a persistent volume, a pod restart wipes
+> the certificates and re-triggers ACME issuance.
+
+> **DNS-01 and Netbird:** because certificates are issued via the Cloudflare
+> DNS-01 challenge, the cluster does **not** need inbound `80`/`443` from the
+> public internet for ACME. The `LoadBalancer`/`NodePort` above only needs to be
+> reachable by your clients (e.g. over Netbird or your LAN).
+
+---
+
+## Notes and gotchas
+
+- **DNS-01 needs no inbound reachability.** Because the `caddy-cf` image solves
+  the ACME challenge via the Cloudflare API (DNS-01), Caddy does **not** need
+  ports `80`/`443` exposed to the public internet to issue certificates. This is
+  what makes it work behind Netbird. It does need outbound HTTPS to the Let's
+  Encrypt and Cloudflare APIs.
+- **Cloudflare API token scope.** The token needs **Zone → DNS → Edit** on the
+  `ahmza.com` zone. Keep it in a `.env` file (Docker) or a `Secret` (K8s), never
+  in the committed Caddyfile — the config references it as `{env.CF_API_TOKEN}`.
+- **DNS must be managed by Cloudflare.** The `ahmza.com` zone has to be hosted on
+  Cloudflare for the DNS-01 challenge to create the required `_acme-challenge`
+  TXT record.
+- **Do not double-compress.** SWS compression is off by design; Caddy's `encode`
+  directive is the only place compression happens. Enabling both wastes CPU.
+- **Do not duplicate headers.** Security headers are set in the `Caddyfile`. SWS
+  has `security-headers = false` so there is no conflict.
+- **Cache-Control comes from the origin.** SWS already sets long-lived caching on
+  static assets and short/no-cache on HTML. Caddy passes these through; avoid
+  adding conflicting `Cache-Control` header directives in the `Caddyfile`.
+- **Health checks.** Both examples use SWS's `/health` endpoint for active
+  upstream health checking, and it also works as a K8s liveness/readiness probe
+  on the blog pod itself.
+- **HTTP/3.** The Docker example publishes `443/udp` to enable QUIC. Remove it if
+  your network path does not support UDP.

nginx.conf

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-# auto detects a good number of processes to run
-worker_processes auto;
-
-#Provides the configuration file context in which the directives that affect connection processing are specified.
-events {
-    # Sets the maximum number of simultaneous connections that can be opened by a worker process.
-    worker_connections 1024;
-    # Tells the worker to accept multiple connections at a time
-    multi_accept on;
-}
-
-
-http {
-    # what times to include
-    include       /etc/nginx/mime.types;
-    # what is the default one
-    default_type  application/octet-stream;
-
-    # Sets the path, format, and configuration for a buffered log write
-    log_format compression '$remote_addr - $remote_user [$time_local] '
-        '"$request" $status $upstream_addr '
-        '"$http_referer" "$http_user_agent"';
-
-    gzip on;
-    gzip_disable "MSIE [1-6]\.(?!.*SV1)";
-    gzip_vary on;
-    gzip_proxied any;
-    gzip_comp_level 9;
-    gzip_buffers 10 8k;
-    gzip_http_version 1.1;
-    gzip_types text/plain text/css text/xml text/javascript image/webp image/svg+xml image/x-icon application/javascript application/x-javascript application/json application/xml application/xml+rss;
-
-    server {
-        # listen on port 80
-        listen 80;
-        # save logs here
-        access_log /var/log/nginx/access.log compression;
-
-        # where's the root dir
-        root /usr/share/nginx/html;
-        # what file to serve as index
-        index index.html index.htm;
-
-        location / {
-            # First attempt to serve request as file, then
-            # as directory, then fall back to redirecting to index.html
-            try_files $uri $uri/ /index.html;
-        }
-
-        # Media: images, icons, video, audio, HTC
-        location ~* \.(?:jpg|jpeg|gif|png|ico|cur|gz|svg|svgz|mp4|ogg|ogv|webm|htc|webp)$ {
-          expires 1y;
-          access_log off;
-          add_header Cache-Control "public";
-        }
-
-        # Javascript and CSS files
-        location ~* \.(?:css|js)$ {
-            try_files $uri =404;
-            expires 1y;
-            access_log off;
-            add_header Cache-Control "public";
-        }
-
-        # Any route containing a file extension (e.g. /devicesfile.js)
-        location ~ ^.+\..+$ {
-            try_files $uri =404;
-        }
-    }
-}

sws.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+[general]
+
+#### Server
+
+# Listen on all interfaces, port 80 (matches previous nginx setup)
+host = "0.0.0.0"
+port = 80
+
+# Root directory of the static site (Hugo `public/` output)
+root = "/public"
+
+# Number of worker threads (0 = auto-detect based on CPU cores)
+threads-multiplier = 1
+
+# Log level
+log-level = "info"
+
+#### Performance / caching
+
+# Compression is handled by the upstream reverse proxy, so it is disabled
+# here to avoid doing the work twice (wasted CPU per request). Re-enable if
+# SWS is ever exposed directly without a compressing proxy in front.
+compression = false
+compression-static = false
+
+# Emit Cache-Control + ETag headers with sensible per-content-type defaults.
+# The origin is the correct place to declare cacheability; the proxy/CDN
+# passes these through. SWS applies long-lived caching to static assets
+# (images, css, js, fonts) and short/no-cache to HTML.
+cache-control-headers = true
+
+#### Routing
+
+# SPA-style fallback: serve index.html when a path is not found on disk,
+# mirroring the previous nginx `try_files $uri $uri/ /index.html`.
+page-fallback = "/public/index.html"
+
+#### Security
+
+# Security headers are set by the upstream reverse proxy, so they are
+# disabled here to avoid duplicate/conflicting headers. Let one layer own
+# the security posture. Re-enable if SWS is exposed without such a proxy.
+security-headers = false
+
+# Health endpoint at /health for container/K8s liveness probes
+health = true